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THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE:
EROSION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION THROUGH FICTITIOUS
CONSENT TO SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Taken individually, each increment of police power may
be of little consequence .. . .But the process is insidi-
ous. Death takes little bites when devouring our freedom.
0. Garrison'
I. INTRODUCTION
The prevention of indiscriminate governmental intrusion
into the private spheres of an individual's life was a funda-
mental doctrine in the formation of American democracy.'
Protection against this invasion of privacy is guaranteed by
the fourth amendment to the Constitution.3 Americans, as
members of a nation of free people, value their security from
unreasonable "searches and seizures." The foundation of this
protection, however, is gradually being eroded. Judicial flex-
ibility in the interpretation of the fourth amendment has ex-
panded the scope of permissible and unregulated surveillance
activities. The following hypothetical based on recent judicial
decisions illustrates this point:
The year is 1982. The government has decided you are a
possible suspect in a tax evasion investigation. You are
placed under surveillance. A "mail cover"4 is placed on
01982 by JoAnn Guzik
1. 0. GARRISON, Spy GOVERNMENT 251 (1967).
2. See N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (John Hopkins University Studies in Historical
and Political Science, Ser. 55, No. 2, 1937); see generally J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT, A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (John
Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Ser. 84, No. 1, 1966).
3. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. The mail cover is a procedure used by law enforcement agencies, with the
1051
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your correspondence; a "pen register"5 is placed on your
telephone line; this same pen register is monitoring the
data requests you make on your home or office computer
as well as any electronic banking transactions you com-
plete by telephone; your business and personal acquaint-
ances are surreptitiously recording your conversations
with them and turning the tapes over to the government;'
your spouse consents to a search of your home; your busi-
ness partner consents to a search of your business;7 and
an electronic tracking device is monitoring where you
drive your automobile.8 You have no knowledge of these
activities.0
At the end of an average day, the following informa-
tion has been collected: The names and addresses of all
your mail correspondents; the phone numbers (and subse-
quently the identity) of all individuals or data banks you
have contacted by phone, and a record of the amounts of
your telephone banking transactions; recorded or re-
peated conversations made in the privacy of your home or
office; potentially incriminating evidence obtained in the
consensual searches, as well as full documentation as to
your public movements.
This information is then researched, compiled, and
stored with the data the government regularly collects on
every individual, a "dossier" is created presenting an in-
depth picture of your private life."
cooperation of the Postal Service, to determine the identities of an individual's corre-
spondents by observing and listing names and addresses on envelopes. See infra
notes 119-36 and accompanying text.
5. The pen register is a device attached to a telephone line which records tele-
phone numbers dialed from a particular phone. It does not intercept the contents of
the conversation. See infra notes 95-118 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 29 (defining consent monitoring); see generally infra notes 29-
52.
7. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
8. An electronic tracking device, more commonly known as a "beeper," allows
the police to monitor an individual's movements. See infra notes 137-38 and accom-
panying text.
9. Generally, all of these activities are not performed at the same time. The
hypothetical serves to emphasize the cumulative effect of uncontrolled government
surveillance and investigatory tactics.
10. A massive amount of information is compiled daily by the federal govern-
ment. For example, one of the largest databanks is located in the central files of the
Social Security Administration. Additional computer files are located within the
FBI's National Crime Information Center. All state regulatory and licensing agencies
maintain files on individuals within their jurisdictions. See A. WEsTIN & M. BAKER,
DATABANKS IN A FREE SociEry 29-101 (Report of the Project on Computer Data Banks
of the Computer Science and Engineering Board, National Academy of Sciences)
1052 [Vol. 22
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If this hypothetical brings to mind "Big Brother" in
George Orwell's 1984, understand that the above surveillance
activities are routinely initiated at the discretion of law en-
forcement agencies, and in many instances may not be consid-
ered "searches" or "seizures" within the fourth amendment."
The average member of society would be shocked, if not out-
raged, upon realizing the extent of his vulnerability to such
surveillance. This vulnerability could, in the worst case, lead
to withdrawal from social interaction and force into seclusion
those individuals who value their privacy. At best, as uninhib-
ited freedom to move about in society is destroyed, individu-
als will sense that their "privacy" is being invaded."'
These uncontrolled invasions of privacy are sanctioned, in
part, by the United States Supreme Court's use of fourth
amendment "assumption of risk" analysis. The "assumption
of risk doctrine" is a line of reasoning that denies constitu-
(1972); A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: DATA BANKS, AND DossIERs 126-61
(1971).
The Privacy Act of 1974 established the Privacy Protection Study Commission to
study the databanks of the federal government. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976 & Supp. IV
1980). One of the Commission's goals was to determine if the laws and regulations
that require governmental agencies to obtain information on individuals are consis-
tent with the right to privacy. The Commission's 1977 report found that government
access to private information is virtually unrestricted. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY
COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SocIETY 348 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as PRIVACY REPORT].
Moreover, the Supreme Court has failed to provide protection in this area. See
infra note 90. One authority refers to a Senate Subcommittee report that described
only the databanks maintained by the executive departments and the independent
governmental agencies; the report is 3500 pages long! Bigelo, The Privacy Act of
1974, 4 COMPUTER L. SERv. (CALLAGHAN) § 5-2, Art. 5 at 1 (1975). The Privacy Protec-
tion Study Commission found that the individual has no control over the disclosure
of this information. PRIVACY REPORT at 13. Furthermore, the Commission recom-
mended that Congress provide all individuals with a statutory expectation of confi-
dentiality in these records. Id. at 362. One commentator has expressed that this
accumulation of data damages an individual's freedom from surveillance: "The issue
of privacy raised by computerization is whether the increased collection and process-
ing of information for diverse public... purposes, if not carefully controlled, could
lead to a sweeping power of surveillance by government over individual lives .
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 158 (1967).
11. The only possible exception to this generalization concerns the use of
beepers. The courts are split over whether or not the device violates fourth amend-
ment search and seizure standards. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
12. This would not assume any violation of a "constitutional" invasion of pri-
vacy, but rather the natural reaction of an individual who feels spied upon. Freedom
of anonymity is threatened. The ability to be the master of one's own life is impor-
tant to most people; when this ability is infringed upon, a person's privacy is
breached. See generally A. WESTIN, supra note 10.
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tional protection against governmental search and seizure re-
lating to whatever information or activity an individual volun-
tarily exposes to the public or releases from his sole control."
This comment will trace the inception and expansion of the
doctrine and analyze its impact on the amendment's protec-
tion of individual privacy.
Initially, "risk" analysis was applied to allow the use of
government informers and secret agents to infiltrate the very
core of an individual's privacy. Eventually, the Supreme
Court approved indiscriminate access to bank records by ra-
tionalizing that when an individual supplies information to a
bank he assumes the risk that the information will be made
known to the government.14 Although free access to bank
records was subsequently prohibited by Congress, 8 the
Court's reasoning retains its destructive force through re-
peated application of risk analysis in related areas. The doc-
trine has been expanded to allow the use of information ob-
tained by mail covers and pen registers. The possible
ramifications from application of the doctrine to new techno-
logical developments in communication and information
processing have not been totally realized; however, they may
very well cause a further erosion of the fourth amendment
and may necessitate additional Congressional action.
In viewing the major areas where risk analysis is applied,
this comment emphasizes the cumulative effect of allowing a
high degree of unregulated government surveillance.' e While
the negative exponential effect on individual privacy rights re-
sults in an equal contraction of fourth amendment scope and
force, this contraction only broadens police power which in-
herently reduces the ability to prevent unreasonable intru-
sions into private areas of a person's life. A framework devel-
13. The "assumption of risk" doctrine discussed in this comment should not be
confused with the legal doctrine in the area of tort law that is also referred to as
assumption of risk. The tort doctrine refers to assumed risk that may mitigate one's
claims for damages.
14. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
15. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub.L. 95-630, 92 Stat. 2697
(1978)(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (Supp. II 1978)).
16. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT, § 2.7, 399 (Supp. 1981)[hereinafter cited as LAFAvw] where the author states:
"It is the cumulative effect of these [surveillance] techniques which provides the
strongest basis for the claim that they constitute an intrusion into. . . privacy. ...
[Ilt is the breadth of the intrusion rather than its depth at any particular instant in
time which is most threatening to privacy."
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ops that can only create fear in the citizens and undermine
the foundations of a free society."
This comment will conclude that notification should be
required in most of the "risk" areas to improve the ability of
all individuals to secure their privacy and preserve their lib-
erty. The effect of a notification requirement on law enforce-
ment investigative activities would vary from being only mini-
mal in some areas to severe in others. Such a balance must be
struck, however, to temper the major fallacy in the "assump-
tion of risk" doctrine: that alternatives exist for the individ-
ual who wishes to avoid assuming these risks.18 In a free-
choice society, when there is no option but to accept govern-
mental control, a means must be provided to protect the inno-
cent from unrestrained police power. The minimal notification
standard suggested in this comment would not provide a com-
plete alternative to having such information exposed, but it
would allow the opportunity to protest indiscriminate access
to this information.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT-PROTECTORATE OF PRIVACY
The Constitution of the United States contains no ex-
press language protecting privacy; however, judicial interpre-
tation of the Constitution has established an implied "right to
privacy."" The constitutional provision most associated with
17. See generally A. WESTIN, supra note 10.
18. In analyzing the Court's application of risk theory, it becomes clear that in
almost all situations the individual is held to have "assumed" a risk, even though he
was unaware of this risk. That is, there may be an awareness of the natural risk one
takes in confiding in another, but there is also a complete unawareness that the gov-
ernment also has immediate access to this information. Justice Marshall joined by
Justice Brennan in a 1979 "risk" decision pinpointed the major fallacy in the Court's
reasoning: "Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice
.... It is idle to speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts where, as a practical matter,
individuals have no realistic alternative." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749-50
(1979)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
19. A discussion of the development of the constitutional "right to privacy" is
beyond the scope of this comment. It is important to note, however, that as the Court
has developed an expanding privacy right in the area of equal protection, it has less-
ened the individual's right to privacy by substantially narrowing fourth amendment
protections. On the development of the right to privacy, see generally Clark, Consti-
tutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19 Vni. L. R.v. 833 (1974);
Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARiz. L. REV. 1 (1979); and Posner,
The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 173.
For the original analysis of the right to privacy concept, see Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
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the concept of privacy protection is the fourth amendment.2
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is a basic
right of all citizens."' To understand the damaging effects of
risk analysis, it is necessary to realize that any contraction of
fourth amendment protection results in destruction of privacy
rights.22
A. Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment-The Origin of
Risk Analysis
1. Background
The Supreme Court's delineation of permissive "eaves-
dropping" surveillance presents the first indication of risk
analysis. In a 1928 Supreme Court decision, Olmstead v.
United States,'2 "wiretapping ' '12 was held not violative of the
fourth amendment. Adhering to a trespass-propertyB stan-
20. See supra note 3. In general, fourth amendment protection is implemented
in the following manner: When a law enforcement practice is considered unreasonable
and is defined as a search or seizure, protection is implemented through application
of the warrant clause. Upon showing of probable cause to a magistrate, a warrant willbe issued which must particularize the person or things to be seized and the place tobe searched. The evidence obtained in the search will only be admissible in court if
the warrant requirements have been met. It is this judicially created "exclusionary
rule" that provides the individual protection, and at the same time acts as a control
on the police. For a detailed treatment of the exclusionary rule, see LAFAvE, supra
note 16, at § 1.1, 3-20. For a concise analysis of fourth amendment substantive rules,
see Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,
356-61 (1974).
21. See generally LANDYNSKJ, supra note 2.
22. Throughout this comment, reference is made to the contraction of fourth
amendment protection. This generally refers to the Court's determination that a par-
ticular investigative activity is not a search or seizure and therefore the warrant re-quirements of the fourth amendment do not have to be met. The requirement ofparticularity in the warrant clause emphasizes the intent of the framers of the consti-
tution to forbid indiscriminate searches and seizures. Surveillance activities, by their
very nature, allow seizure of information totally unrelated to the suspected criminal
activity. It is this indiscriminate access to information that erodes the force of fourth
amendment protections.
23. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
24. "Wiretapping" involves the placement of an electronic listening device on
an individual's telephone line in order to overhear conversations. This procedure is
now controlled by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
25. The Olmstead trespass-property standard was based on the concept that
the fourth amendment protects "persons" and their tangible property (i.e. "houses,
papers, and effects") against unreasonable search and seizure. The fourth amendment
would apply only if the police invaded or trespassed into one of these constitutionally
protected areas. In Olmstead there was no search because the telephone wires ex-
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dard of fourth amendment interpretation, the Court reasoned
that a wiretap does not intrude into a constitutionally pro-
tected area. Because an individual does not own the wires that
carry his conversation beyond the walls of his home, there
could be no trespass, and hence no search. Furthermore, a
conversation possesses no tangible qualities that permit
seizure. The majority opinion, which planted the seed for the
development of risk analysis, suggested that persons who were
exposed to warrantless electronic interception were volunteer-
ing their statements to the government by the very act of
speaking to each other.26
Congress subsequently placed statutory controls on wire-
tapping, 7 and the Court eventually held that such evidence, if
illegally obtained, was inadmissible at trial.2 8 This statutory
control, however, is not applicable to the surveillance activity
of "consent or participant" monitoring effectuated through
the government's use of secret agents and informers.2 9 In ad-
dition, the Supreme Court has been steadfast in its unwilling-
ness to control the use of consent monitoring. The Court has
consistently placed the activities of secret agents and inform-
ers, with or without recording devices, beyond the control of
the fourth amendment.30 It is the Court's decisions in this
tended beyond the defendant's property, and there was no seizure because the fourth
amendment did not protect the intangible conversation. The Court later decided to
abandon the trespass doctrine. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961);
see also infra note 37 and accompanying text.
26. 277 U.S. at 466. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead, wrote of the now
famous "right to be let alone" guaranteed by the Constitution in the fourth amend-
ment. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
27. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976)).
28. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
29. Participant or consent monitoring involves three basic situations. In each
situation, one of the parties is usually under the direction of a governmental agency
and, without the knowledge of the other party, does one of the following: 1) uses an
electronic device to transmit the conversation directly to a government agent, 2) con-
sents to the use of a recording device by a government agent or informer to overhear
or record the conversation, or 3) records the conversation himself. Throughout this
comment, the terms "bugged" or "wired" refer to the informant's use of a recording
or transmitting device. See Greenwalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping &
Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring With the Consent of a Participant in a
Conversation, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 189, 190 n.l (1968). Governmental consent moni-
toring is specifically exempted from statutory control. See infra note 73.
30. It is argued by law enforcement agencies that the use of secret agents and
informers is necessary for the detection of consensual crimes such as illegal narcotics
transactions, prostitution, and tax evasion. The Supreme Court has apparently ac-
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area that have given the assumption of risk doctrine its initial
momentum. An examination of these decisions will illustrate
the foundation and expansion of the risk doctrine.
2. Assumption of Risk Becomes a Judicial Doctrine
In the earliest consent monitoring case, On Lee v. United
States,81 the Court upheld the use of evidence obtained
through a wired informer. The informer, an old friend of On
Lee's, twice entered On Lee's laundry and engaged in conver-
sation in which On Lee made self-incriminating statements
regarding illegal narcotics activity. Unknown to On Lee, the
conversations were simultaneously transmitted to a federal
agent outside the building. Relying on the Olmstead trespass
doctrine, s the Court held that On Lee had lost his fourth
amendment rights by consenting to the informer's entry into
the laundry. The majority could see no fourth amendment is-
sues and stated that it would be "farfetched" to analogize the
questions involved in eavesdropping on a conversation in
which one party had consented to those involved in an unrea-
sonable search and seizure.38 This emphatic advocacy of the
use of informers was strengthened in 1971 when the Court re-
fused to overrule On Lee in United States v. White. "
In 1957, assumption of risk language expressly appeared
in Rathbun v. United States," where the Court approved the
use of evidence obtained through overhearing a conversation
with the permission of one of the parties. The Rathbun Court
held that "[elach party to a conversation takes the risk that
the other party may have an extension telephone and may al-
low another to overhear the conversation.""6 When such a risk
is taken, the Court concluded, there is no violation of the pri-
vacy rights of any party to the conversation. In the midst of
the development of the assumption of risk doctrine, the Court
changed direction in basic fourth amendment interpretation.
cepted this argument. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); see
also Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agents, 76 YALE L.J. 994, 994 (1967) (indicates
that the only limit placed on the activities of secret agents is the defense of entrap-
ment, and that this defense is ineffectual).
31. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
32. See supra note 25.
33. 343 U.S. at 754.
34. 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971). See infra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
35. 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
36. Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
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In the next section, it will be seen that this development did
little to suppress the use of risk analysis.
3. Transition Away From the Strict Trespass-Property
Standard of Fourth Amendment Interpretation
In the early 1960's, after decades of strict adherence to
the Olmstead trespass doctrine, the Court decided that fourth
amendment property-based analysis should give way to a de-
termination of whether or not the privacy of the home is con-
sidered invaded by a particular surveillance activity. A "con-
stitutional area of privacy" developed which allowed for a
more flexible interpretation of whether or not a government
activity constituted an unreasonable intrusion. The fourth
amendment gained added strength when the Court also pro-
vided constitutional protection for overheard conversations.3 7
The implementation of fourth amendment safeguards no
longer hinged on the occurrence of non-consensual physical
trespass to seize tangible "papers and effects." This transition,
nevertheless, did not displace risk analysis. Instead of defining
a particular government surveillance technique as nontrespas-
sory and therefore permissible, the use of risk analysis ad-
dressed the activity of the individual. By placing this activity
beyond the constitutional area of privacy, an individual was
held to assume the risk of surveillance and was consequently
denied fourth amendment protection.
In Lopez v. United States,8 the defendant was convicted
of attempted bribery of an Internal Revenue agent. Under
pretense of desiring to accept a bribe, the agent equipped
himself with a recording device and induced Lopez to repeat
an incriminating statement. Lopez' conviction was based on
both the agent's testimony and the corroborating recording.
The Supreme Court in upholding the conviction refused to ac-
cept the argument that Lopez' consent for the agent to enter
his office was negated by the agent's falsification as to his pur-
pose. As there was no unlawful invasion into Lopez' constitu-
tionally protected area of privacy, there could be no illegal
37. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). In Silverman the Court
held that a microphone driven into a party wall connected to the heating ducts of
Silverman's dwelling was a search, even though no physical trespass had occurred. In
addition, the Silverman decision recognized that the intangible conversation had
been seized. Id. at 511-12.
38. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
19821 1059
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seizure of his words. The risk that Lopez took in offering the
bribe included the risk that the offer would be accurately re-
produced in court. The electronic device was not used to gain
information that the government would not have otherwise
obtained, it merely provided the "most reliable evidence pos-
sible." The device neither saw nor heard more than the
agent.89
In the dissent, Justice Brennan directly addressed the
concept of risk analysis. He granted that Lopez had assumed
a risk that the agent could repeat the conversation because
this was a risk inherent in all communications not privileged
by law. He cautioned, however, that this risk became signifi-
cantly different with the introduction of recording devices.
Because an individual in ordinary circumstances does not as-
sume his conversation is being recorded, the risk doctrine be-
comes a fictitious waiver of privacy rights that is incompatible
with free communication. Justice Brennan further reasoned
that because there was no way to avoid this risk, and no alter-
native to mitigate it, there was no privacy unless an individual
"keeps his mouth shut on all occasions.' 40
In the mid-sixties, the trend of the Court's decisions to
place restrictions on police activities"1 led many to believe
that restraints on consent monitoring would also develop. In-
stead, in a series of cases in 1966, the Court began a more
emphatic use of risk analysis to deny constitutional protection
in this area. Hoffa v. United States'2 upheld the jury tamper-
ing conviction of Teamster president James Hoffa. Federal
agents contacted Partin, a local union official known to Hoffa.
Partin was instructed to maintain close contact with Hoffa
and gather information on Hoffa's activities.' s The evidence
39. Id. at 439.
40. Id. at 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Warren joined the dissent
in suggesting that On Lee should be overruled in light of the Court's abandonment of
the trespass doctrine. 373 U.S. at 442 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result). The Chief
Justice was able to distinguish Lopez on the basis of the corroborative value of the
recording. Such a distinction indicates that, at least as far as the Chief Justice is
concerned, the purpose of the evidence obtained appears to determine its constitu-
tionality. Id. at 443.
41. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
42. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
43. Partin had spent over two months in his role as government informer. For a
complete account of Partin's activities, see Note supra note 30. at 996-99.
1060 [Vol. 22
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obtained by Partin was the basis for Hoffa's jury tampering
conviction. Justice Stewart, writing the Court's opinion,"' re-
ferred to Justice Brennan's dissent in Lopez and held that
Hoffa had assumed the risk inherent in normal conversation
when he divulged information to Partin."' The Court noted
that Hoffa's misplaced confidence in Partin was a voluntary
risk and as such was beyond the scope of constitutional pro-
tection. In denying Hoffa's claim that his privacy was in-
vaded,46 Justice Stewart explained that fourth amendment
protection was afforded only when an individual relied on the
security of a protected area; in risking conversation with Par-
tin, Hoffa did not rely on the security of his hotel room and
had therefore assumed the risk of surveillance.47
Lewis v. United States,48 decided the same day as Hoffa,
upheld a conviction based on an undercover agent's purchase
of narcotics from Lewis at his residence. Chief Justice War-
ren, in a unanimous opinion, stressed that because Lewis had
turned his home into a commercial center and invited the
agent in for a felonious purpose, he was not entitled to fourth
amendment protection. The Lewis Court emphasized that the
agent had entered the premises for the very purpose contem-
plated by Lewis and had heard, seen, and taken only what was
necessary for that purpose.49 In Hoffa, there was no such invi-
tation to the informer, Partin, for a specific and limited pur-
pose. It would not have mattered if the sale in Lewis had
taken place in another location, while in Hoffa it was impera-
tive that Partin invade Hoffa's private life. This conflict in
reasoning indicates the Court's willingness to condone this
type of surveillance regardless of how offensive it may be to
44. Chief Justice Warren dissented on the merits. Justice Clark, joined by Jus-
tice Douglas dissented based on an improper grant of certiorari. Justice Douglas
wrote a separate dissent arguing that he would reverse Hoffa's conviction if he were
sure that the government had placed Partin in his role as informer. 385 U.S. at 349
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
45. 385 U.S. at 301 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. at 439).
46. Hoffa had argued that Partin's failure to disclose his role as a government
informer negated any consent for Partin to be in the hotel room and that Hoffa's
words were therefore illegally "searched." 385 U.S. at 300.
47. Id. at 301.
48. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
49. But see Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 1968 Sup. CT. Rav. 133, 145 (suggests that the agent did not enter for the
purposes contemplated by Lewis, but rather to obtain evidence against him).
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the individual or to society. An inherently intrusive charac-
teristic of these investigative activities is the inability to limit
the surveillance to obtaining only incriminating evidence. Ac-
cess is also gained to information unrelated to any alleged
criminal conduct. The result is a "general search" for evidence
in direct contradiction to the specific purpose of fourth
amendment protection." An individual, whether innocent or
guilty, loses control over the dissemination of information he
desires to keep within the confines of the immediate conversa-
tion. Thus the rule remaining after Hoffa indicated that sim-
ple awareness of the mere presence of another person resulted
in assuming both the risk of government surveillance and dis-
closure of private information."2
Before continuing this review of the evolution of risk
analysis in the area of consent monitoring, it is necessary to
50. This conflict in the Court's reasoning can be further illustrated by the fact
that the Court could have dismissed Lewis' claim by relying on its decision in Lopez
because there was no electronic recording involved in either case. Instead, the Court
chose to address the fourth amendment secret agent issue. Furthermore, on the same
day the Court decided Hofla and Lewis, it also decided Osborn, where a court order
was obtained to plant a wired informer. In Osborn, the Court held the evidence ob-
tained by the informer was admissible. The Court stated: "There could hardly be a
clearer example of 'the procedure of antecedent justification before a magistrate that
is central to the Fourth Amendment' as a 'precondition of lawful electronic surveil-
lance'." 385 U.S. 323, 330 (1966)(quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263,
272 (1960) and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. at 464). Thus, in three opinions
decided the same day, the Court found three different rationales for denying fourth
amendment protection against the use of secret agents. See Kitch, supra note 49, at
135-40; Note, supra note 30, at 995-1019.
51. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 2.
52. See Note, supra note 30, at 999, where the author considers the likely reac-
tions of citizens should they be asked to,
rank the offensiveness of three practices:
(1) the police will be allowed to search your house without force during
the daylight hours;
(2) the police will be allowed to offer your friends very strong induce-
ments to report to them any illegal activities on your part;
(3) the police will be allowed to employ agents who may be strangers,
business associates or friends, to invite or encourage you to take part in
a criminal venture.
The clear state of constitutional law after Hoffa is that (1) represents an
invasion abhorrent to the American way of life, but (2) and (3) are quite
proper. The average citizen would hardly agree.
Id. at 1010. See Note, Interception of Conversations by Government Informers, 81
HAiv. L. REv. 191, 193 (1967)(the Hoffa decision presents a "gaming view of the
fourth amendment"). Contra Greenwalt, supra note 29, at 225 (widespread partici-
pant monitoring would likely have only a "subtle negative effect on people's willing-
ness to communicate").
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digress and examine the Court's landmark fourth amendment
decision in Katz v. United States.53 This 1967 decision was
viewed as a timely redefinition of the scope of fourth amend-
ment protection against electronic surveillance . 4 Katz was
convicted of interstate transmission of gambling information.
Evidence obtained through a warrantless wiretap on a public
telephone was used against the defendant. The Supreme
Court reversed his conviction and reaffirmed the demise of the
Olmstead trespass doctrine by focusing on the result of the
surveillance rather than the method utilized.5 Justice Stew-
art, writing for the Court, found no "constitutional signifi-
cance" in the government's claim that the listening device did
not penetrate the wall of the telephone booth. Furthermore,
the Court declined to adopt a rigid formulation of a constitu-
tionally protected area, but indicated a broader interpretation
by noting that Katz was justified in relying on the privacy of
the telephone booth. This transition to the individual's intent
to keep his activities private broadened the area of constitu-
tionally protected privacy. Justice Stewart set forth the new
standard to determine the scope of fourth amendment protec-
tion: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not subject of Fourth Amendment
protection . . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitution-
ally protected."' 6
Declaring that the fourth amendment could not be trans-
lated into a general constitutional right to privacy, the Court
avoided defining the specific interests the amendment does
protect. The Court did find, however, that the fourth amend-
ment provided protection against "certain kinds of govern-
mental intrusions" and that the amendment should be inter-
preted as protecting "people," not "areas.""'f This
indecisiveness may be what caused the transformation of the
concurring opinion in Katz to the one generally used to define
fourth amendment protection. Justice Harlan, in his concur-
rence, suggested a twofold test to determine if an activity de-
53. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
54. Kitch, supra note 49, at 133; see Amsterdam, supra note 20, at 382 ("Katz
is a watershed in fourth amendment jurisprudence").
55. See supra note 25.
56. 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 50-53.
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served constitutional protection: First, an individual must ex-
hibit an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and
second, that society recognize this exception as reasonable."
Admittedly, this is no more precise than the majority opinion,
but it was hoped that the combination of the two would pro-
vide a flexible vehicle to allow increased constitutional protec-
tion in a rapidly advancing technological environment.5'
B. The Conflict Between "Reasonable Expectation of Pri-
vacy" and "Assumption of Risk"
To understand the conflict between the Katz "justifiable
reliance" or "reasonable expectation" privacy tests and the
risk doctrine, it must be realized that any misdirected inter-
pretation of limitations imposed by Katz leads to a broad ap-
plication of the risk doctrine. For example, in a situation
where it is determined that an individual maintains an "un-
reasonable" expectation of privacy, he is considered to "know-
ingly" expose this information to the public and thereby as-
sumes the risk of further publication or transmission of his
private activities.
Although Katz defined a privacy oriented standard for
protection against government surveillance, the decision left
open the question of whether the government's use of consent
or participant monitoring would be constitutionally pro-
scribed under this new standard. Therefore, to complete this
analysis of the evolution of the assumption of risk doctrine, it
is necessary to examine the 1971 decision in United States v.
White" which considered consent monitoring.
The White decision, and the subsequent opinions which
relied on its reasoning, may have done the greatest damage to
the viability of Katz as a major precedent for the protection
of privacy. Federal agents, acting without a warrant, equipped
an informer with a transmitting device to monitor conversa-
tions with White, a suspected drug dealer. These conversa-
tions, concerning the price and delivery of heroin, were over-
heard by federal agents. The agents' testimony regarding the
58. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
59. Contra Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 383-84 (the test developed by Justice
Harlan in his concurring opinion "destroys the spirit of Katz and most of (its] sub-
stance"). For a complete discussion of the Katz decision, see Kitch, supra note 49.
60. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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illegal drug transactions resulted in White's conviction.1 On
appeal, the seventh circuit relied on Katz and overturned the
conviction by holding that the government's warrantless elec-
tronic eavesdropping violated the fourth amendment."2
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion,63 reversed the
seventh circuit on two grounds. Four Justices found that
White did not present a fourth amendment issue in light of
the Katz and Hoffa decisions, and alternatively, that the sev-
enth circuit erred in applying Katz retroactively." The White
Court revitalized the assumption of risk doctrine by holding
that a person who "contemplat[es] illegal activities must real-
ize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the po-
lice.""' The Court also upheld the viability of On Lee, Lopez,
Lewis and Hoffa."6
Justice White, writing for the plurality, focused on the
risks undertaken by the speaker rather than using either of
the tests proposed by Justices Stewart or Harlan in Katz. If
there is any possibility or probability that an individual's col-
league is cooperating with the police, then there is no consti-
tutional protection because the speaker assumed this risk.
Furthermore, Justice White found no persuasive difference in
61. The agents had monitored a total of eight conversations: Four in the in-
formant's home and four in either White's home, the informant's car, or a public
restaurant. Id. at 747.
62. United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
63. Justice White, writing for the plurality, held that the informant's use of the
transmitter was not violative of the fourth amendment any more than the informant's
own testimony would be. Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Burger agreed. The four
Justices refused to apply Katz retroactively. 401 U.S. at 754; see infra note 64. Jus-
tice Black concurred on the grounds that eavesdropping by electronic devices is not a
search and seizure within the fourth amendment. 401 U.S. at 754. Justice Brennan,
concurring, agreed on the retroactivity issue, but stated that a warrant should be
required both where an informant secretly records the conversation and where he
secretly transmits the conversation to the police. Id. at 755. Justice Douglas dissented
on the grounds that electronic surveillance violates the fourth amendment whether by
recording or transmitting and that Katz should be applied retroactively. Id. at 468-
95. Justice Marshall dissented on the grounds that electronic surveillance violates the
fourth amendment and that Katz should be applied retroactively. Id. at 795-96. Four
of the Justices, Marshall, Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan, also believed that On Lee
should be overruled in light of Katz. The seventh circuit had so held by overturning
White's conviction. Justice Brennan also went further and suggested that Lopez also
be overruled. Id. at 755. The split on the Court was 4-4 on the validity of consensual
monitoring, and 5-4 on the use of an informant to do the monitoring.
64. The Court had previously held in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244
(1969), that Katz would not be applied retroactively.
65. 401 U.S. at 752.
66. Id. at 749-50, 749 n.3.
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the risk simply because the participant to the conversation
was bugged rather than unbugged. Again reviving the Lopez
"reliable evidence" argument, Justice White stated the need
to avoid creating constitutionally sanctioned barriers to accu-
rate and reliable evidence. 5 Apparently, the use of the risk
doctrine allows the justification for warrantless searches to
turn on the degree of incriminating evidence accumulated.
Justice White further reasoned that since there is no constitu-
tional prohibition against the use of unaided testimony, there
should be no denial of the use of a more accurate version of
the same testimony. The opinion clearly avoids any attempt
to place judicial or constitutional controls on the govern-
ment's use of secret agents. 9
Justice Douglas, dissenting,7 0 found electronic surveil-
lance to be a great threat to human privacy. He questioned
how most forms of this activity could ever be considered rea-
sonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Analyz-
ing the Court's decisions in this area and recognizing the lack
of self-restraint on the part of law enforcement officials, he
concluded that the application of the warrant clause in this
area was essential to the preservation of a free society.7 1 Jus-
tice Harlan, in a separate dissent, examined the assumption of
risk concept and concluded that because it is the law itself
that determined what risks to impose on society, the judiciary
should not simply mandate societal expectations. To deter-
mine if the risk of surveillance should be imposed on citizens,
he suggested that the extent of the impact on an individual's
sense of privacy should be balanced against the usefulness of
a form of surveillance as a technique of law enforcement. 72
Consequently, despite the constitutional standards enun-
ciated in Katz and the statutory controls on electronic surveil-
67. Id. at 752.
68. Id. at 753. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
69. See Note, Warrantless Use of Electronically Equipped Informers, 85 HARV.
L. REv. 250 (1971).
70. 401 U.S. at 756 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 765. In a situation like White where government authorities plant an
informer based on a high degree of suspicion, there is no reason why a warrant could
not be obtained based on probable cause as in Osborn. See supra note 50; see gener-
ally Comment, Electronic Eavesdropping And The Right To Privacy, 52 B.U.L. Rzv.
831 (1972).
72. 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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lance through federal legislation," the government is totally
unrestrained in the use of the secret agents and informers. In
failing to delineate any recognizable difference between moni-
tored and unmonitored agents, the Court has ignored its own
decisions criticizing the inherent evil nature of electronic
eavesdropping." ' As a result, an innocent person is placed in
an untenable position; he can be subjected to surveillance and
when the evidence proves valueless the invasion of his privacy
becomes justified because he assumed the risk of having a
conversation that might have produced evidence for the
government.7"
Commentators have espoused the need for fourth amend-
ment protection in this area, and most agree that the White
opinion cannot be rationally justified in light of Katz. An in-
dividual does not knowingly expose his words to be recorded
or used against him by a government agent. Under Katz this
expectation of freedom from electronic recording is certainly
considered reasonable by society. It becomes essential to re-
move the fictitious notion of consent and apply Katz as a gen-
eral prohibition against electronic surveillance by government
informers.7 ' Furthermore, as long as the police are allowed to
freely plant informers, an individual is left with no choice: If
electronics surveillance is suspected, a person will be afraid to
talk to anyone either in the privacy of his home, office, or on
the telephone, and if the individual fears the use of an unbug-
73. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. See supra note 29. Government participant moni-
toring is specifically exempted from statutory control: "It shall not be unlawful under
this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral commu-
nication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to
the communication has given prior consent to such interception." 18 U.S.C. §
2511(2)(c).
74. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
75. In White, Justice White specifically focused the holding on the typical crim-
inal. 401 U.S. at 752-53. Even if it is granted that the typical criminal would not
change the substance of his communication when he is aware of assuming the risk of
surveillance, the same cannot be said for the innocent citizen who becomes aware that
he has assumed this risk. "[T]alk about 'criminals' assuming the risks means that we
all assume the risks." Amsterdam, supra note 20, at 470 n.492. Such an all or nothing
approach to assuming the risk of surveillance does not recognize that individuals may
change their expectations of privacy in response to the police activity involved. Note,
supra note 69, at 254.
76. One commentator declares that this notion of consent is an absurdity. Else-
where in the law, any voluntary consent would be vitiated by the fraudulent represen-
tations of another. Posner, supra note 19, at 188.
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ged informer, he will be afraid to talk to anyone at all.77
The following sections of this comment consider the wide
range of additional surveillance activities allowed under an as-
sumption of risk theory. In these areas, the government does
not utilize a third party to invade an individual's privacy, but
is permitted to gain access to private information without an
individual's knowledge or knowing consent. The narrowing
scope of fourth amendment protections precludes protection
against these unreasonable searches and seizures.
III. THE PERVASIVENESS OF RISK ANALYSIS
A. Bank Records
In Miller v. United States7 the Supreme Court extended
the assumption of risk doctrine to allow access to an individ-
ual's bank records. Legislative reaction to Miller was swift
and to the point: Congress passed the Financial Privacy Act of
197879 in direct response to the Supreme Court's decision.80
77. Amsterdam, supra note 20, at 407. Professor Amsterdam also emphasizes
that a distinction must be made between the risks inherent in normal conversation
and those that occur when the government introduces informers into the conversa-
tion. The latter situation creates the danger of destroying liberty. He further notes
that even if there is a normal risk assumed by an individual, the government should
not be unrestrained in adding to those risks. Id. at 406.
As more and more individuals become aware of this destruction of liberty, they
are taking steps to protect themselves from surveillance. The demand for anti-bug-
ging devices has grown steadily in recent years. Advertisements for surveillance de-
tection devices are found in many newspapers and magazines throughout the country.
For example, the March 1982 edition of United Mainliner, a magazine distributed by
United Airlines to all its passengers, featured an advertisement for the "007 Bionic
Briefcase." This unobtrusive looking case can sweep nearby telephone systems to de-
tect wiretaps and phone bugs, warn of any electronic bugging device in the vicinity,
and allow the person holding the case to monitor conversations. UNITED MAINLINER,
March 1982, at 1S. One can also purchase briefcase lie detectors, automobiles with
built-in debugging, and electronic eavesdropping detectors that are "disguised as
packs of cigarettes." Quade, Lawscope, For Someone on Your Gift List, 69 A.B.A. J.
142 (1983).
78. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
79. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3432 (1976 & Supp. VI 1980)).
80. "[This act] is a congressional response to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Miller . . . . The Court did not acknowledge
the sensitive nature of these records . . . and decided . . . the customer
had no constitutionally recognizable privacy interest in them. . . . Con-
gress may provide protection for individual rights beyond that afforded
in the Constitution."
H.R. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Seas., 124 CONG. REc. 9306 (1978). This comment suggests
a similar standard to protect privacy in some "risk" areas.
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Under the Act governmental access to financial records is
prohibited81 unless:
1. The customer authorizes the disclosure in conform-
ance to strict waiver requirements;"' or
2. Disclosure of the records is in response to an adminis-
trative subpoena or summons which will be issued only if
there is reason to believe the records relate to a legitimate
law enforcement inquiry; and notification is given to the
customer on or before the bank receives the order. This
notification procedure allows the customer ten days in
which action may be taken to prevent disclosure;8 or
3. General federal search warrant requirements are
met. 4
As can be seen, the Financial Privacy Act precludes the
81. 12 U.S.C. § 3402 reads in part:
No Government authority may have access to or obtain copies of, or the
information contained in the financial records of any customer from a
financial institution unless the financial records are reasonably de-
scribed and -
(1) such customer has authorized such disclosure in accordance with sec-
tion 3404 of this title;
(2) such financial records are disclosed in response to an administrative
subpoena or summons which meets the requirements of section 3405 of
this title;
(3) such financial records are disclosed in response to a search warrant
which meets the requirements of section 3406 of this title;
(4) such financial records are disclosed in response to a judicial sub-
poena which meets the requirement of section 3407 of this title; or
(5) such financial records are disclosed in response to a formal written
request which meets the requirements of section 3408 of this title.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 3404 provides in pertinent part:
(a) A customer may authorize disclosure . . . if he furnishes to the
financial institution and to the Government authority ... a signed and
dated statement which-
(1) authorized such disclosure for a period not in excess of three
months; (2) states that the customer may revoke such authoriza-
tion at any time... ; (3) identifies the financial records ... to be
disclosed; (4) specifies the purpose for which, and the Govern-
ment authority to which, such records may be disclosed ....
83. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3405-3407 contain similar provisions regarding the issuance of
an administrative or judicial summons, or formal written request from a Government
authority.
84. 12 U.S.C. § 3406 provides in pertinent part:
(a) A Government authority may obtain financial records ... if it ob-
tains a search warrant pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
(b) No later than ninety days after the Government authority serves the
search warrant, it shall mail to the [customer] . . . a copy of the search
warrant ....
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government from obtaining personal records unless advance
notice is given. This notification requirement provides protec-
tion against indiscriminate access by investigative agencies
seeking to escape the warrant requirement. It appears feasible
that the basic scheme of this act can be utilized to provide
protection in other areas where the Court has applied the risk
doctrine."s
Although the Miller decision, as it pertains to bank
records, is moot, the Court's holding provides considerable
room for a volatile expansion of risk analysis into related ar-
eas. It is therefore necessary to consider the reasoning in the
Miller opinion and its effect on privacy rights.
Miller was convicted of conspiring to defraud the govern-
ment of tax revenues due from his operation of an illegal
whiskey distillery. Responding to a subpoena from the United
States Attorney, Miller's banks surrendered evidence neces-
sary for Miller's conviction. The evidence included copies of
checks written by Miller as well as his complete account
records. In upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court
looked to the Hoffa86 decision and reasoned that because
Miller had placed this information outside any zone of consti-
tutionally protected privacy, his fourth amendment rights
were not violated. 87
The Miller Court declared that because the documents
were not Miller's property, but rather property of the bank,
there was no invasion of his privacy. By this analysis, the
Court appears to have returned to a property-based stan-
dard.ss The importance of this transition is the potential neg-
85. The conclusion of this comment will point out the areas where government
surveillance in related areas could be controlled by similar statutory regulation.
86. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
87. 425 U.S. at 440.
88. The Court's return to this standard is further complicated by the passage of
the Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970)(codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)), requiring banks to maintain certain
records. Checks drawn on the bank and presented for payment, account statements,
and records necessary to reconstruct a checking account and furnish an audit trial are
just some of the records that must be maintained. In an incredibly circuitous line of
reasoning, the Miller Court assumed that Miller had lost any reasonable expectation
of privacy concerning the bank records when Congress enacted this legislation. Be-
cause the express purpose of the Act was to require that records be kept for their
usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations, the individual (Miller)
could not expect them to be private. 425 U.S. at 441. This broad grant of statutory
control over constitutional privacy protection undermines Katz and emphasizes the
erosion of fourth amendment protections by the Supreme Court. Miller and Katz
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ative effect on a society where massive amounts of informa-
tion are required daily for basic transactions. The Court's
failure to provide privacy protection for individuals in our in-
formation gathering society is clearly stated in the following
passage:
This Court has repeatedly held that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not prohibit the obtaining [of] information re-
vealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Govern-
ment authorities, even if the information is revealed on
the assumption that it will be used only for the limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will
not be betrayed.89
The deleterious effect of this passage is compounded by the
Court's determination that Miller, in using a negotiable in-
strument (a check), had taken a risk that the bank would con-
vey pertinent information to the government. If this reasoning
is valid, a startling paradox is presented by the above passage:
How can an individual assume information will be used for a
limited purpose and that his confidence will not be betrayed,
and at the same time assume the risk that the opposite will
occur simply as a result of the otherwise completely legal
means by which he was required to convey that information? 0
cannot be reconciled. Posner, supra note 19, at 213. Professor LaFave has stated that
"[t]he result reached in Miller is dead wrong, and the Court's woefully inadequate
reasoning does great violence to the theory of Fourth Amendment protection ...
developed in Katz." LAFAvE, supra note 16, at § 2.7, 411. See generally Comment, A
Bank Customer Has No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy of Bank Records: United
States v. Miller, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 414 (1977); Comment, Bank Secrecy Act -
Threat to First & Fourth Amendment Rights, 27 RUT. L. REV. 176 (1973).
89. 425 U.S. at 443 (emphasis added).
90. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled that the right to privacy limits gov-
ernment'powers in the collection of data concerning individuals. See supra note 10
for a discussion of data collection by the government. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1977), the Court upheld the legality of a New York statute requiring physicians and
pharmacists to forward to state authorities copies of prescriptions for medicines con-
taining certain narcotics. The majority opinion, while recognizing the threat to pri-
vacy that such data collection involved, found legitimate state goals to be the overrid-
ing concern. Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, noted that data collection must be
limited if the individual is deprived of a constitutional right. Id. at 606-07. Justice
Stewart, in a separate concurrence, however, suggested that the Constitution, to the
extent that it protects privacy, does not recognize a "general interest in freedom from
disclosure of private information." Id. at 607-08.
The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 522 (1976) and the Trade Secrets
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1980), both govern the control of data that is in the possession
of the federal government. The Court has held that neither of these acts grant an
implied private right of action to enjoin disclosure by the government agency.
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The dissent in Miller relied on Burrows v. Superior
Court,91 a California decision in which the acquisition of bank
records was found violative of both the fourth amendment
under Katz, and the California state constitution. Commenta-
tors have praised Burrows as being the correct approach for
the protection of privacy right of citizens.92 The reasoning of
the California court directly supports the main thesis of this
comment: "For all practical purposes, the disclosure by indi-
viduals or business firms of their financial affairs to a bank is
not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in
the economic life of contemporary society without maintain-
ing a bank account.""3
In light of the rejection of property concepts in defining
fourth amendment protection in the Katz case, the Miller de-
cision seems to be an anomaly. Had the Court looked at the
totality of the information gathered, rather than at who pos-
sessed the documents, it could not have found that Miller
knowingly exposed such personal information to the public.' 4
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
91. 13 Cal. 3d 328, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974). The Burrows court
expressed concern over the totality of information that is revealed by depositor
records: "In the course of such dealings, a depositor reveals many aspects of his per-
sonal affairs, opinions, habits, and associations. Indeed, the totality of bank records
provides a virtual current biography." Id. at 247, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at
172. The California Supreme Court has shown a willingness to grant extensive expec-
tations of privacy to its citizens. For example, in People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 86
P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), the court held that an individual maintains a
constitutionally protected privacy interest in the contents of his trash can placed
outside his home.
92. See, e.g., CHOPER, KAMISAR & TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS & DE-
VELOPMENTS 1978-1979 (1979); LaFave, supra note 16, at § 2.7, 416.
93. 13 Cal. 3d at 247, 529 P.2d at 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
94. The Miller decision appears to have far-reaching ramifications. In United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), IRS agents arranged to obtain bank records by
burglary. The Court without hesitation decided under Miller that the depositor had
no protectable fourth amendment interests in the copies of checks and deposit slips
that had been retained by the bank. In Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949
(1979) the court, relying on Miller, held that telephone subscribers have no fourth
amendment basis for challenging government inspection of their toll records, since
subscribers, like bank depositors, have taken the risk in revealing their affairs to third
parties. This risk includes the possibility that the information will be conveyed by
that person to law enforcement officials, either voluntarily or in response to compul-
sory process.
1072 [Vol. 22
1982] FICTITIOUS CONSENT 1073
B. Pen Registers
The cumulative effect of the erosion of fourth amend-
ment protections stemming from the application of the risk
doctrine is most evident in the government use of "pen regis-
ters."95 A pen register is used to determine the identity of the
individuals with whom a suspect communicates by telephone.
The device is attached to telephone company equipment at
the request of an investigative agency and records the num-
bers dialed out on the telephone line. The numbers of incom-
ing calls are not recorded."6 Federal legislation prohibiting the
interception of telephone conversations is not applicable to
pen registers 7 because the register does not intercept the
communication itself.98 The use of the pen register was not
considered by Congress to be a serious threat to an individ-
ual's privacy.
95. A precise description of the pen register was given in United States v.
Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1966):
The pen register is a device attached to a given telephone line usually at
a central telephone office. A pulsation of the dial on the line to which
the pen register is attached records on a paper tape dashes equal in
number to the number dialed. The paper tape then becomes a perma-
nent and complete record of outgoing numbers called on the particular
line. . . .The pen register cuts off after the number is dialed on outgo-
ing calls and after the ringing is concluded on incoming calls without
determining whether the call is completed or the receiver is answered.
There is neither recording nor monitoring of the conversation.
Id. at 807. A TR-12 Touch-Tone decoder is a device analogous to the pen register. It
is used for touch-tone telephones and prints out the number in arabic numerals
rather than a series of dashes. Note, The Legal Constraints Upon the Use of a Pen
Register as a Law Enforcement Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1028, n.3 (1975).
96. There are devices termed "grabbers" or "trappers" that are able to monitor
incoming numbers. They are used frequently by telephone companies to detect mis-
use of their equipment, primarily to trace obscene phone callers. Investigative agen-
cies also make use of these devices to learn the identity of persons calling into a
phone. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Au-
thorizing an In Progress Trace of Wire Communications Over Tel. Facilities, 616 F.2d
1127 (9th Cir. 1980)(grabber used to learn the identity of callers to three phones: IRS
suspected that the phones were being used for an illegal gambling operation).
97. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
98. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1968) reads in part:
Paragraph 4 of [§ 2520] defines "intercept" to include the aural acquisi-
tion of the contents of any wire or oral communication by any elec-
tronic, mechanical, or other device. Other forms of surveillance are not
within the proposed legislation . . . .The proposed legislation is not
designed to prevent the tracing of phone calls. The use of a "pen regis-
ter," for example, would be permissible . . . .The proposed legislation
is intended to protect the privacy of the communication itself and not
the means of communication.
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In a 1977 Supreme Court case involving the telephone
company's refusal to install a pen register, the Court did not
consider any fourth amendment issue but affirmed the specific
legislative exclusion." Decisions in the lower courts were in
conflict about the degree of intrusion presented by the use of
a pen register. Some courts, in granting orders for the installa-
tion of the device, assumed the activity was a search and
seizure,100 while other jurisdictions deemed it unnecessary to
determine if a search was taking place. 10 1 The ninth circuit, in
1977, directly addressed the fourth amendment issue and held
that the use of pen registers did not violate substantive fourth
amendment standards. Relying on Katz, the ninth circuit held
that an individual's expectation of privacy attached to the
context of the conversation and not to the fact that a conver-
sation occurred.'O"
In an effort to resolve this conflict, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Smith v. Maryland.03 In Smith, a young
woman was robbed and then began receiving obscene phone
calls from the alleged thief. After tracing the suspect, the po-
lice requested the telephone company to install a pen register.
No warrant or court order was obtained. The register revealed
a call to the victim's home. On this basis a warrant was ob-
tained and a subsequent search produced a phone book
opened to the victim's number. Smith's conviction was based
primarily on this evidence.
Recognizing that Smith had no property right in the tele-
phone company's equipment, the Court addressed his claim
that his reasonable expectation of privacy was violated by the
use of the pen register. Justice Blackmun, writing for the ma-
jority, did great violence to the Katz rationale by stating that
people in general probably do not maintain any expectation of
privacy in the telephone numbers they dial.'" It is difficult, if
not impossible, to reconcile this reasoning with Katz. Consid-
ering the Katz ruling that the fourth amendment protects
"people," and that only what an individual "knowingly" ex-
99. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
100. See, e.g., Application of the United States of America in the Matter of an
Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register, 538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1976).
101. See, e.g., United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1975).
102. Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1977).
103. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
104. Id. at 743.
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poses to the public will be denied protection, it cannot be re-
alistically concluded that Smith knowingly exposed to the
public the fact that he dialed the young woman's number. It
destroys any meaningful interpretation of the word "know-
ingly" to suggest that every individual exposes his partners in
communication to the public by the simple act of dialing his
telephone. 105
In applying the assumption of risk analysis to Smith's
phone calls, the Court noted that it was irrelevant that he
made the calls in the privacy of his own home. Regardless of
where he had placed the call, he still would have given the
number to the phone company. In conclusion, Justice Black-
mun acknowledged that even if Smith had entertained an ex-
pectation of privacy as to his phone calls, this was an area of
privacy that society would not recognize as reasonable.1 0 6 This
analysis avoids the result of obtaining the numbers an indi-
vidual dials. The number is used to locate and identify the
person whose numbers are dialed, and to determine the rela-
tionship of a suspect to a particular location he calls. Thus,
when any individual dials his phone he is assuming the risk
that the telephone company will reveal the number to the po-
lice, and that the police may subsequently identify the parties
to the conversation.
Justice Marshall, dissenting, emphasized the underlying
fallacy in the application of the risk doctrine: because the
telephone has become a personal and professional necessity,
the individual cannot help but assume the risk of
surveillance.1 07
105. Furthermore, when Justice Stewart made the determination in Katz that
what an individual "knowingly" exposes to the public is not given constitutional pro-
tection, he was referring to the Lewis situation, where the individual invited the gov-
ernment agent into his home for the limited purpose of committing a crime. He was
not mandating a general prohibition of constitutional protection for any and all infor-
mation that an individual makes public. 389 U.S. at 351. Justice Stewart dissented in
Smith on the basis of the Katz decision. 442 U.S. at 745.
106. 442 U.S. at 743.
107. Id. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Supra note 18 for a discussion of
Justice Marshall's dissent in Smith. Justification for pen registers is found in one
area of investigation. When the use of the phone is itself the substantive crime that is
being committed, as in the making of obscene phone calls, there is probably no other
means to apprehend the criminal. This justification disappears when the register is
used to obtain all the numbers dialed by an individual who is suspected of some other
type of illegal activity which is not strictly limited to the use of a telephone. This
activity may have no relationship at all to the information gained by the law enforce-
ment agency. This data is used to identify acquaintances of the suspect and create an
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A number of technological innovations designed to im-
prove the quality and efficiency of communication are severely
threatened by the Smith reasoning. Today, the primary
means of transmitting information, often in forms other than
the human voice, from one area to another is by the use of
telephone lines.0 8 This advanced concept of information
transmission is not limited to businesses possessing computer
networks. Anyone today may gain access to a number of mod-
ern data systems.
For example, an individual may pay bills or make trans-
fers from one bank account to another simply by pressing a
particular sequence of numbers on a Touch-Tone Phone.109 If
an investigative agency were trying to identify an individual's
bank in order to apply for a warrant or bank record subpoena,
and the suspect was unlucky enough to have a pen register
placed on his telephone line, the pulses that pay his bills and
transfer his funds would also direct the police to his bank." 0
The greatest threat created by use of a pen register exists
in the use of a computer, either at home or in the office. In the
case of the home user, he merely purchases an "acoustic
coupler" '' and his home computer becomes a device that can
communicate with various data-banks and information agen-
cies. By paying a small fee, the computer can be linked to a
wide variety of services. An individual can make his own air-
line reservations, contact stock exchanges, and receive Dow
Jones reports in the privacy of his own home." 2 A pen register
information file on his lifestyle. The ultimate purpose in this type of investigation is
to formulate a degree of probable cause sufficient to obtain a search warrant. This
appears to be a common way to circumvent the initial burden of proof.
108. See, e.g., R. GLASGEL, BASIC TECHNIQUES IN DATA COMMUNICATIONS, (Rev.
2d Ed. 1979).
109. For example, in using Bank of America phone banking, a sequence of num-
bers pressed on a touch-tone phone activates a computer at the bank. Dollar amounts
are then pressed on the phone buttons, and the computer at the other end of the line
enters and records the transaction. The bank will make the necessary transfers to the
accounts activated (e.g. utility bills, credit card payments, auto and home loan pay-
ments, etc.) Bank of America, Brochure: Versatell Phone Banking, AD-767 (Oct.
1981). The pen register although not identifying the specific accounts is recording the
dollar amounts as well as any code numbers entered.
110. The Privacy Protection Commission was particularly concerned over the
loss of privacy rights from Electronic Fund Transfers. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note
10, at 116.
111. An "acoustic coupler" is a device that converts the standard telephone into
a data transn,,s3ion device. See generally GLASGEL, supra note 108.
112. Source is a data-bank service company. Their brochure lists the following
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installed on the telephone line of an individual who utilizes all
these services would reveal the identity of all the data banks
he contacted. This potential surveillance capability is magni-
fied if a central computer is used to store all the information
obtained from surveillance of a broad range of individuals or
business firms. A massive cross pattern of communication and
correlative acquaintances could be revealed. It has been sug-
gested that the most significant threat to personal freedom in
the future will be the inevitable link of the pen register and
the computer. 113
There is electronic equipment available today that can be
placed anywhere along a data transmission line. Such equip-
ment is capable of copying, storing, reading, and decoding any
and all data transmitted. 114 There is no aural acquisition as
the information is basically recorded in readable form as it
flows along the telephone line. These "data monitors" are pri-
marily used to check the accuracy of the data flow; however,
the potential for abuse is more than obvious. The data moni-
tor, in effect, eavesdrops on the electronic pulses that flow
along the line. If the information being monitored is consid-
ered "content," 1 5 and if the monitor is intercepting the com-
munication, protection may be afforded under federal wire-
tapping legislation.1 1 6  However, in applying the Court's
reasoning in Smith, in conjunction with Miller and the tradi-
tional statutory interpretation of "content inception," there
remains an undefined issue. If the register or data monitor is
installed on telephone company equipment, in which the indi-
vidual has no interest under Smith, and under Miller he has
no interest in the information he voluntarily releases to a
services available to the owner of a home or office computer: UPI News Services,
General Financial Service (stock market information), and Legislate (current legisla-
tive news). The brochure ironically declares, "you maintain watch over your govern-
ment." The Source, Sept. 30, 1981 (Source Telecomputing Corp.).
113. WESTIN, supra note 10, at 43. Newsweek, reported that it is estimated that
3 million home computers will be sold in 1982 alone. Worldwide sales of home com-
puters are expected to reach 50 million by 1985. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1982, at 50.
114. Data monitors are produced by a large number of firms. Some representa-
tive examples are Halcyon Communications, Inc., San Jose, Ca. and Atlantic Re-
search Inc., Alexandria, Va.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) defines "content" as follows: "'Contents'. .. includes
any information concerning the identity of the parties to (the] communication or the
existence, substance, purport, or meaning of [the] communication."
116. See supra notes 24, 73 & 115 for pertinent sections of the Title III wiretap-
ping legislation.
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third party, it is possible for the Court to deny protection to
the individual whose data transmission is monitored.1 7 The
uncertainty as to the ability of federal legislation to provide
protection in this type of situation was foreseen by one com-
mentator who noted that recent legislation in the area is a
"technological anachronism" because of its failure to deal with
the new computer technology and new forms of data
transmission."i8
This expansion of risk analysis which denies fourth
amendment protection to individuals when using the tele-
phone illustrates the far-reaching effect of unrestrained sur-
veillance. There is no way for the individual to realize he is
being monitored in this way, unless the government later ac-
knowledges the use of a pen register or data monitor. A statu-
tory notification requirement prior to installation of the de-
vices would afford a substantial degree of privacy protection.
If the individual fails to prevent the surveillance, he is at least
aware that his communications are being monitored.
C. Mail Covers
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality
of mail covers."" The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
however, relied on the Miller bank records decision and ap-
plied assumption of risk analysis in Choate v. United
States'20 to mail covers.121 Choate first came to the attention
of law enforcement authorities when an undercover informant
alleged Choate was connected with a cocaine importation
117. In reading the definition of "contents," supra note 113, the data transmis-
sion appears protected; however, a literal reading of the statute also appears to pro-
hibit the use of pen registers because the numbers obtained lead to the identity of the
parties to the communication.
118. MILLER, supra note 10, at 161-68.
119. Under the postal regulations, a mail cover is defined as follows:
"Mail cover" is the process by which a record is made of any data ap-
pearing on the outside cover of any class of mail matter, including the
contents of any second; third; [or] fourth-class mail matter as now sanc-
tioned by law, in order to obtain information in the interest of (i) pro-
tecting the national security, (ii) locating a fugitive, or (iii) obtaining
evidence of commission or attempted commission of a crime.
39 C.F.R. § 233.2 (c)(1)(1975).
120. United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1978) (reh'g and reh'g en-
banc denied).
121. It is generally agreed that the Supreme Court would follow this reasoning.
See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note. 16, § 2.7 at 66-67 (Supp. 1981).
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scheme. After various other investigative tactics failed to pro-
duce substantial evidence, the Bureau of Customs placed a
mail cover on Choate's correspondence. Identification of a
South American return address was listed as the purpose of
the cover; nevertheless, information gathered through the use
of the mail cover pertained only to Choate's domestic
affairs.1 22
The district court suppressed the evidence obtained
through the mail cover 128 and determined that Choate's ex-
pectation of privacy in the mails was violated. Any voluntary
disclosure of the information on his mail was for the postal
employees' limited purpose in sorting and routing the mail.
The district court stated that the only interest of the Postal
Service in performing this surveillance was to aid the govern-
ment in "snooping." The government's only basis for the war-
rantless intrusion was a "feeling in the acknowledged absence
of probable cause that a crime was being committed." 4 Rec-
ognizing that the Postal Service was a government sanctioned
monopoly, the district court emphasized the individual's lack
of alternatives to process the mail. Furthermore, the court
found that in a free society, if government were given such a
monopoly and then allowed to utilize it, at its own discretion,
to invade the privacy of its citizens, such action would be tan-
tamount to a licensing of "blatant circumvention of constitu-
tional rights.1"1
2
The court of appeals,1 26 reversing the district court, lik-
ened the mailing of a letter to the risk a depositor takes under
Miller, and concluded that there was no unreasonable inva-
sion of Choate's privacy. Choate had voluntarily conveyed this
information to the postal employees and waived any constitu-
tion right to keep the information private. The court of ap-
peals also referred to the Hoffa-Lopez line of cases and held
that even if the district court assumed the information was for
a limited purpose, the fourth amendment would not prevent
122. Justice Hufstedler, dissenting, reasoned that because the mail cover infor-
mation was procured by fraudulent misrepresentations on the application, there was
an even greater constitutional violation. 576 F.2d at 193 (Hufatedler, J., dissenting).
123. Choate v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 261 (C.D. CAL. 1976).
124. Id. at 270.
125. Id. at 271.
126. 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1978).
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its seizure when it was given a third party.2 7
The need for privacy protection in this area is para-
mount. Although the mail cover is regulated by the Postal
Service, the procedure is neither authorized nor controlled by
an act of Congress.2 It is implemented at the sole discretion
of the Postal Service. No judicial officer is involved at any
stage. Any law enforcement agency may obtain a mail cover
by submitting a written request to the Postal Service's inves-
tigative division. A showing of reasonable grounds that such a
mail cover is necessary to gain information regarding the com-
mission or attempted commission of a crime is all that is re-
quired.2 9 There is no notification requirement even after the
investigation is complete. It is possible that an individual may
never learn that a mail cover was used against him. 30
Far-reaching implications of this procedure become evi-
dent when it is possible to learn the identities, addresses, and
frequency of contact of most of an individual's correspondents
through a one-month mail cover operation. Considering that
in its most basic use the mail cover is a method to defeat the
probable cause requirement of the warrant clause, it appears
to be an egregious affront to the concept of constitutionally
protected privacy.' 3 ' Any attempt to rationalize the use of the
mail cover with an individual's expectation of privacy falls in-
127. Id. at 175.
128. In Choate, counsel for the Postal Service admitted that there was no statu-
tory authority for the practice. Id. at 189, n.80 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
129. Law enforcement agencies include any federal, state or local unit which has
as one of its "functions . . . [the investigation] of commission or attempted commis-
sion of acts constituting a crime." 39 C.F.R. § 233.2(c)(4) (1981). 0. GARRUSON, SPY
GOVERNMENT (1967) lists the following agencies as being among those which typically
apply for mail cover placement: The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization; The
Dept. of Justice; The U.S. Dist. Atty; The Army, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence;
The National Security Agency; NASA; The FBI; The SEC; The Treasury Dept.; as
well as state and local sheriffs and police departments. This list is not all inclusive.
Id. at n.112. The mail cover practice was investigated by the Senate Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice in 1965; see Note, Invasion of Privacy: Use and Abuse of
Mail Covers, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRos. 165 (1968).
130. In fact, in Choate the use of the mail cover was inadvertently discovered in
a pre-trial motion to suppress a hearing. 576 F.2d at 187 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
The dissent went on to emphasize that Miller should be inapplicable because the
depositor willingly gives his records to the bank, while in the mail cover operation,
the individual is unaware that this information file is being created. Id. Justice Huf-
stedler also pointed out the consistent fallacy in risk analysis when she stated that
"that addressee of mail cannot by choice opt out of the system." Id. at n.70.
131. Contra United States v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Ill. 1972)(holding
that there is no reasoning in Katz to hold a mail cover operation unconstitutional).
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adequately short of reality. Even if a person realizes that the
postal employee must read the mail in order to process it, to
say that this lessens an expectation that the mail is private
reduces the concept of privacy protection to meaninglessness.
What is reasonable is the assumption that the information,
once used for its intended limited purpose, will be forgotten
and not stored or recorded for future use.
Applying risk analysis in this area illustrates the doc-
trine's inherent irrational nature. If an individual is unaware
that a correspondent is mailing him a letter, there can be no
voluntary consent to assume the risk that the identity of the
sender will be made known to any and all interested persons.
Until he receives the mail, he cannot know the quality of the
information he is voluntarily conveying. It follows that where
there is a single governmental agency controlling the mails,
any individual, innocent or guilty, must assume that any and
all use of this mail service exposes him to arbitrary scrutiny,
even before he is aware of his use of the service. His only
choice would be to have absolutely no mailing address. This
lack of alternatives and the lack of pre-investigation notice is
crucial in understanding the shrinking scope of fourth amend-
ment protection.
The legal justification for using mail covers may also have
significant effects on the current expansion and development
of, electronic mail systems. Correspondence may be transmit-
ted electronically in a variety of ways.""' Private manufactur-
ers of facsimile printers have set up long range networks to
allow firms to transmit their intra-company correspondence
directly over telephone data transmission lines.1 13 In February
of 1982, the Postal Service began operation of Electronic
Computer Originated Mail (ECOM) which allows large vol-
ume mailers to electronically transmit a letter to the post of-
fice. 1 ' The transmission is then turned into a printed letter,
put into envelopes, and then delivered to the recipients. The
long range plan of the Postal Service is to provide this service
132. J. MARTIN, FuTruiw DEvmLoPMmrs IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, 259-66 (2d Ed.
1977).
133. "To send a handwritten letter electronically, it is fed into a facsimile ma-
chine, transmitted, and received by another facsimile machine which produces a copy.
Most of today's facsimile machines transmit... over telephone lines." Id. at 264.
134. Pauly, A Computerized Pony Express, Electronic Computer Originated
Mail, NEwSWEEK, Jan. 18, 1982, at 65.
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for everyone as a means of sending first class mail.1 " Consid-
ering the ease of obtaining a mail cover at the present time,
an individual who must "voluntarily" use this system is as-
suming an even greater risk: the voluntary exposure of the
contents of the communication to the government."'
By applying the warrant requirement to the use of mail
covers, the necessary protection is obtained. If this is shown to
be a serious detriment to the efficiency of police investiga-
tions, then the less stringent notification requirement should
be mandatory to preserve the concept of a free society. Given
the high degree of respect this nation places on the right of
free speech and open disclosure, there is nothing more chilling
than a surveillance activity that places individuals in fear of
all their correspondents becoming known. Correspondence is
speech-it is the free transference of ideas and information
from one individual to another and it must be protected from
arbitrary governmental scrutiny.
D. Beepers, Consent Searches, and More
In this final, but by no means all-inclusive section, a
number of areas are briefly mentioned where individuals also
lose control over their privacy by unknowingly assuming the
risk of governmental intrusion. An in-depth analysis of these
areas is beyond the scope of this comment. The purpose of
presenting the examples is to emphasize the cumulative
amount of surveillance permitted under the risk doctrine.
The risk doctrine has been applied to allow the use of
electronic tracking devices known as "beepers"137 that moni-
tor an individual's movements in public. Relying on the White
decision, courts have analogized the beeper to a wired in-
former and determined that an individual loses his fourth
amendment protection from surveillance when he voluntarily
ventures onto the public highways.'"
135. B. Strassberg, Some Legal and Policy Problems of Electronic Mail, 4 CoM-
PUTER L. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 509, 510-11 (1978).
136. In a 1975 second circuit decision, the fourth amendment was held not to
prohibit the photocopying of the envelopes. The potential conflict with the new elec-
tronic mail system is obvious. United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975).
137. See generally Dowling, "Bumper Beepers" and the Fourth Amendment,
13 CRIM. L. BuLL. 266 (1977); Comment, Beepers, Privacy and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 86 YALz L.J. 1461 (1977).
138. 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Assumption of risk analysis is also used in the area of
consent searches.'" When more than one individual has con-
trol over a particular place or item of property, the courts
have determined that each individual has assumed the risk
that the other will allow the police to gain access to the item
or place in question. 40
Risk analysis also appears in decisions regarding adminis-
trative searches,14 1 jail searches of visitors, 42 and airport
searches.14 s The assumption of risk doctrine becomes a vola-
tile weapon that is easily applied in any circumstance where
one individual comes into contact with any other person or
government agency.
IV. CONCLUSION
Upon illustrating the cumulative effect of the Court's
widespread application of assumption of risk analysis, it be-
comes apparent that government surveillance must be cur-
tailed. When an individual who values his privacy is
threatened in the performance of his daily activities, the
power of government has extended too far. The additional re-
alization that in many areas of an individual's life there are no
alternatives for avoiding the assumption of surveillance risks,
evidences the destructive force of risk analysis. To avoid as-
suming risks, an individual must withdraw almost completely
from participation in society and forego the use of the mails,
the telephone, the automobile, and conversation itself. Life
must be as transaction free as possible.'4 4 The result is clearly
an Orwellian form of society. This withdrawal not only vio-
lates the functional purpose of the fourth amendment but also
prevents the preservation of the free and open society to
139. See generally LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, § 8.3, 700-01.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Frazier v. Cupp,
394 U.S. 731 (1969). See also White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking
About People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 165.
141. See, e.g., Almeida Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)(business-
man is regulated industry consents, in effect, to restrictions placed on him by the
government).
142. See, e.g., State v. Manghan, 125 N.J. Super. 162, 313 A.2d 225 (1973).
143. United States v. Doran, 428 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1973)(passenger assumes
the risk that his belongings will be searched).
144. Professor Amsterdam suggests that an individual would have to hide in a
dark cellar to escape surveillance. See Amsterdam, supra note 20, at 402-03.
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which Americans are committed. Given the rapid technologi-
cal advances that occur almost daily, and the Court's failure
to recognize the potential for abuse in this area, it is impera-
tive that restrictions be placed on governmental access to a
person's private life.
Absent full application of the fourth amendment's ante-
cedent justification with magistrate approval, and the specific-
ity protection of the warrant clause, a minimal statutory stan-
dard of notification would afford the opportunity to protect
one's privacy. The standards set forth in the Financial Privacy
Act of 1978 could be adopted to control the use of pen regis-
ters, mail covers, and non-content data monitoring. 1 4 Admit-
tedly, the notification requirement would render ineffective
the government's use of wired informers or secret agents who
monitor private conversations, and also negate the usefulness
of warrantless beeper installations. As these forms of surveil-
ance intrude into very intimate aspects of an individual's pri-
vate life, they should be controlled by the more stringent war-
rant requirements of the fourth amendment and the statutory
regulation of Title III.
A dichotomy in constitutional interpretation exists if
Katz protects the individual in a public telephone booth from
having his words broadcast to the world and yet the same pro-
tection is not afforded the individual who has a direct conver-
sation with another in the privacy of his own home. Unless
some control is implemented, the number of risks that an in-
dividual unknowingly assumes begins to multiply exponen-
tially each day. By necessity, one must reach out and expose
his activities to the public. Professor Wayne LaFave, a noted
fourth amendment expert, points out that it is precisely be-
cause all individuals must frequently reach out beyond their
own private sphere to participate in life itself that the Court's
reasoning in assumption of risk cases "does great violence to
the rationale of the fourth amendment protection that had
emerged in Katz."'"16
We are left with the infamous "assumption of risk" doc-
trine, more aptly termed: "a hybrid of factual and fictitious
elements and of individual and societal judgments.' ' 4 ' How-
145. See supra notes 81-84.
146. CHOPER, KAMISAR AND TRIBE, supra note 92, at 140.
147. Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55, 71 (9th Cir. 1973)(Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
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ever, Katz also remains a viable alternative. Although the risk
analysis decisions have negated its effectiveness in some areas,
its power is still evident in the majority holding: "Wherever a
man may be, he is entitled to know that he will be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.'' 8 The erosion of the
scope of fourth amendment protections must be halted, either
through a more realistic interpretation of Katz, or through a
statutory notification requirement.1 49 It is imperative that un-
restrained government surveillance be recognized as an intru-
sion into the privacy of all individuals, whether innocent or
guilty. Without such an awareness, wherever a person may be,
he will not be free.
JoAnn Guzik
148. 389 U.S. at 359.
149. Justice Hufstedler, in an excellent dissent in Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55,
clearly states the problem of eroding the scope of the fourth amendment:
A constitutional right continuously diluted becomes no right. Destroy-
ing a right protected by the Fourth Amendment because of distaste for
the remedy makes little more sense than destroying a patient for failure
to respond to chosen medication. If the remedy is wrong, it is time to
reexamine the remedy, not to diminish the right.
Id. at 74 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
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